

Joint Terminology At the Heart of Doctrine

By GEORGE H. HOCK, JR.

Recently, the largest component of the joint force, the U.S. Army, confirmed its new chief of staff, General Martin Dempsey. General Dempsey, speaking 2 days after his nomination, outlined issues that he thinks are important for the Army going forward—one of which is “getting the words right.” Dempsey, who previously commanded U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, emphasized that the Service is making changes to its core doctrine, and for that reason he is serious about getting the definitions right. Words matter. He went on to stress why doctrinal language is so important by quoting Mark Twain: “The difference between the almost-right word and the right word is really a large matter—it’s the difference between the lightning bug and the lightning.” Current joint terminology efforts are consistent with its Service counterparts’ commitment to ensuring concise, clear language.

It is Department of Defense (DOD) policy to improve communications and mutual understanding within the department, among other Federal agencies, and between the United States and its international partners through standardization of military and associated terminology. Joint Publication (JP) 1–02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* and its associated database are the key documents within the joint doctrine discipline that support this policy. It is the primary terminology source when preparing correspondence, including policy, strategy, doctrine, and planning documents and applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Services, Joint Staff, combatant commands, DOD agencies, and all other DOD components. As such, it is by far the most widely referenced document within the entire body of joint doctrine, receiving nearly

250,000 individual page views and 23,000 full document downloads per month.

Over 25 years after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandated “jointness,” Service personnel still sometimes struggle to communicate with one another during joint operations. No doubt there has been marked improvement, but there is room for more. In 1989, OSD decided that joint terminology should be consolidated in one place and managed accordingly. The responsibility was transferred to the J7. The Secretary of Defense, in DOD Directive 5025.12, *Standardization of Military and Associated Terminology*, directed the use of JP 1–02 (originally called JCS Pub 1) throughout DOD to ensure standardization of military and associated terminology. The idea was not to capture the voluminous Service-specific technical terms but those of a broader nature that have significance in the planning and conduct of joint operations. Currently, there are ongoing initiatives to improve JP 1–02 which include appropriately standardizing and annotating source publications for all entries.

As early as 1993, source documents were identified and noted in JP 1–02 and the newly developed Joint Terminology Master Database (JTMD) in order to provide a contextual basis for proper understanding of each term. Additionally, a process was established for terms to be reviewed regularly as part of the normal revision cycle of the source document to ensure relevance. This methodology of sourcing terms in conjunction with the normal joint doctrine development process continues. Yet even with such a process, entries such as “white cap—a small wave breaking offshore as a result of the action of strong winds. See also wave” remain in JP 1–02. *White cap* and *wave* were defined in JP 1–02 almost exactly as they

are in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, begging the question of their utility as entries.

In late 2005, however, the joint/Service terminologist’s working group embarked on the sourcing project guided by the mantra “precise terms used precisely” and nears completion today. The results of this multi-phase long-term effort is that from the high water mark of approximately 6,000 DOD and North Atlantic Treaty Organization terms in 2005 in JP 1–02, approximately 2,500 of them (without approved sources and those that are deemed unnecessary) have been removed. The fourth and final term sourcing coordination is in progress. There are still 1,250 terms without sources annotated in JP 1–02, but they have candidate sources identified for resolution during the current JP revision cycle. It should be noted that each removed term is kept if ever needed again, along with over 20,000 other entries in the JTMD archive. *Wave* is now more appropriately defined in a military context in JP 1–02, but *white cap* remains a target of our project.

The other joint terminology initiative in progress is standardizing entries by enforcing the brief “Definition Writing Guide” benchmarks. This guide is part of the recently updated Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5705.01D, “Standardization of Military and Associated Terms,” which governs JP 1–02. Concise terminology is critical to military communication, and the CJCSI guidance makes a stark distinction between desired definitions and unwanted descriptions. A *definition* is a formal statement of the exact meaning of a term that enables it to be distinguished from any other. A *description*, in contrast, is a narrative containing informa-

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tion about the term that is not constrained in format or content. Only definitions are permitted in JP 1–02.

The primary focus of J7 guiding instruction and efforts is to ensure the quality and

relevance of entries in JP 1–02 for the user. The U.S. military is the most advanced, specialized, and complex joint force the world has ever seen, which makes a broad, overarching joint lexicon designed to cross-connect

operations that much more important. J7 is committed to furthering the mantra of precise terms used precisely and will continue to ensure joint terminology is maintained at the heart of doctrine. **JFQ**

JPs Under Revision

JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*
 JP 1–0, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*
 JP 1–04, *Legal Support to Military Operations*
 JP 1–06, *Financial Management Support in Joint Operations*
 JP 2–0, *Joint Intelligence*
 JP 2–01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*
 JP 2–03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*
 JP 3–0, *Joint Operations*
 JP 3–00.1, *Strategic Communication*
 JP 3–01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*
 JP 3–03, *Joint Interdiction*
 JP 3–04, *Joint Shipboard Helicopter Operations*
 JP 3–07, *Stability Operations*
 JP 3–07.3, *Peace Operations*
 JP 3–07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*
 JP 3–08, *Interorganizational Coordination during Joint Operations*
 JP 3–12, *Cyberspace Operations*
 JP 3–13, *Information Operations*
 JP 3–13.1, *Electronic Warfare*
 JP 3–13.3, *Operations Security*
 JP 3–13.4, *Military Deception*
 JP 3–15, *Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations*
 JP 3–15.1, *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations*
 JP 3–16, *Multinational Operations*
 JP 3–27, *Homeland Defense*
 JP 3–28, *Civil Support*
 JP 3–32, *Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations*

JP 3–33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*
 JP 3–34, *Joint Engineer Operations*
 JP 3–35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*
 JP 3–40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*
 JP 3–41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management*
 JP 3–50, *Personnel Recovery*
 JP 3–57, *Civil-Military Operations*
 JP 3–59, *Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations*
 JP 3–60, *Joint Targeting*
 JP 3–63, *Detainee Operations*
 JP 3–72, *Nuclear Operations*
 JP 4–0, *Joint Logistics*
 JP 4–01, *The Defense Transportation System*
 JP 4–01.2, *Sealift Support to Joint Operations*
 JP 4–01.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Transportation Terminal Operations*
 JP 4–01.6, *Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore*
 JP 4–02, *Health Service Support*
 JP 4–06, *Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations*
 JP 4–08, *Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations*
 JP 4–10, *Operational Contract Support*
 JP 5–0, *Joint Operation Planning*
 JP 6–01, *Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations*

JPs Revised (within last 6 months)

JP 2–01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support in Joint Operations*
 JP 3–05, *Special Operations*
 JP 3–68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*
 JP 4–03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine*



Department of Defense – Department of State

AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY



Every 2 years, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to review the missions, responsibilities, and geographical boundaries of each geographic combatant command in the U.S. military and recommend to the President, through the Secretary of Defense, any changes that may be necessary. The review process includes combatant commanders, Service chiefs, and Department of Defense (DOD) leadership.

DOD Unified Command Plan (UCP) 2011 is a key strategic document that established the missions, responsibilities, and geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) for commanders of combatant commands. DOD geographic commands' areas are encompassed within designated borders. President Barack Obama signed the document April 6, 2011.

Adjustments in the 2011 UCP make U.S. Northern Command responsible for advocating for Arctic capabilities; U.S. Africa Command's maritime boundary will include the Cape Verde zone; and U.S. Southern Command will include the maritime boundary of the South Sandwich Islands.

Functional Command Revisions

U.S. Strategic Command's responsibility for combating weapons of mass destruction and developing a Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations is expanded. U.S. Transportation Command is assigned responsibility for synchronizing planning of global distribution operations.

The mission of the State Department Regional Bureaus is to implement U.S. foreign policy, conduct diplomatic relations, and manage and promote U.S. interests in their respective regions. State Department Regional Bureau areas of responsibility include land areas within DOD AORs and overlap multiple DOD AORs (see color key).







Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands

There are six geographic combatant commands: U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Northern Command. There are four functional combatant commands: U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Joint Forces Command (to be disestablished by August 30, 2011).

Department of Defense Geographic Commands

-  U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)
-  U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
-  U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)
-  U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)
-  U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)
-  U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM)

Department of State Regional Bureaus

-  Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
-  Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
-  Bureau of African Affairs
-  Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
-  Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
-  Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs




JFQ

3rd Quarter 2011

A Professional Military Journal

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
by National Defense University Press
Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University, Washington, DC





Call for Entries *for the Academic Year 2011–2012*

Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition *and the* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff National Defense and Military Strategy Essay Competition



As a military or civilian defense professional and student, you probably have something to say about a U.S. national security topic familiar to you. Start **NOW** to explore ideas, map out research, and outline your argument before you are caught up in the school year.



Who's Eligible: You, the military or civilian student—including international students—of a U.S. senior war college, staff college, or advanced warfighting school, or Service research fellow.

What: Research and write an essay, with options to write a concise opinion piece (1,500 words max) or a documented research paper (5,000 words max). Must be original research or informed commentary, unclassified, and submitted via your college after an internal selection process. May relate to a course writing requirement. Not a school solution—but an innovative, imaginative approach to a national security-related issue of your choosing.

When: The deadline for colleges to submit entries to NDU Press is April 25, 2012. After an initial round of judging, final judging occurs May 15–16, 2012, by a panel of PME faculty judges who meet at National Defense University.

It is strongly recommended you begin your planning and research in fall 2011 in order to allow time for your school to evaluate and select nominations for the contests. To keep the competition manageable, the number of entries is capped for each school.


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For further information, contact your college's essay coordinator, or go to:

<http://www.ndu.edu/press/essayCompetitions.html>



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NEW from NDU Press

Understanding War in Afghanistan by Joseph J. Collins

The author describes this concise book as an “intellectual primer on war in Afghanistan.” Joseph J. Collins is one of few people qualified to make such a claim. His career as a Soldier, policymaker, and academic has kept him involved for more than 30 years with the various wars in this central Asian country, from the Soviet occupation through current U.S. operations. The book attempts to provide military leaders, civil servants, diplomats, and students with the intellectual basis to prepare for further study of or assignment in Afghanistan. After examining the land, people, and culture, the book covers the history of the country, including the Soviet-Afghan War, the civil war, the advent of the Taliban, the war against the Taliban, and the U.S. effort from 2001 to the present. It also includes a chapter on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, which Collins describes as essential to understanding the nature of the current conflict. He concludes with the potential choices and issues facing national leaders for the future, notably the necessity for the United States to redouble its efforts in building Afghan capacity so that the country can stand on its own two feet.



PRISM

A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations

PRISM 2, no. 3 (June 2011) takes on a variety of topics on complex operations, although several offerings focus on aspects of criminal activities. The Features section opens with Lieutenant General Robert Caslen and Major Bradley Loudon writing on forging a comprehensive approach to counterinsurgency. The next three articles deal with aspects of the criminal challenge for counterinsurgency and complex operations, and include Douglas Farah on terrorist-criminal pipelines and criminalized states, Colonel Robert Killebrew on criminal insurgency in the Americas, and Professor Bruce Baker on building law-enforcement capacity in Africa. The remaining Feature articles present Professor Stephen Krasner on state-building, the Honorable Franklin Kramer on irregular conflict, Dr. Max Manwaring on three cases of transnational criminal organizations, and Dr. James Carafano on interagency reform. Next, From the Field articles include, from Germany, Dr. James Derleth and Jason Alexander on stability operations; from Haiti, David Becker on gangs and “community counterinsurgency”; and from the Pacific, Dr. Andrew Leith on regional assistance to the Solomon Islands. The Lessons Learned article, by Dr. Stephen Mains and Dr. Gil Ad Ariely, discusses the management of operational knowledge. Finally, the issue concludes with an interview of General David Petraeus.

PRISM explores, promotes, and debates emerging thought and best practices as civilian capacity increases in order to address challenges in stability, reconstruction, security, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare. Published by NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations, *PRISM* welcomes articles on a broad range of complex operations issues, especially civil-military integration. Manuscript submissions should be between 2,500 and 6,000 words and sent via email to prism@ndu.edu.



JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY

Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press
National Defense University, Washington, DC

